In my dissertation, Rethinking Logical Hylomorphism and Kant’s Logical Legacy, I examine Kant’s pure general logic. Kant’s central logical contribution is often taken to be the introduction of logical formality. Recent influential work argues that this hylomorphic distinction between the form of thought (syntactic structure) and its content (semantic significance) is what first makes logic purely formal. While this historical narrative places Kant at the center of the formal achievements in contemporary logic, it does so at the cost of committing Kant to views antithetical to central tenets of his transcendental idealism. I argue that a closer look at Kant’s pure general logic reveals a hylomorphic structure which distinguishes between the twofold nature of thought: (1) thought’s relation to its object (matter) and (2) thought’s relation to consciousness (form). Though strikingly different from contemporary notions of logical hylomorphism, I take Kant’s account to offer a deeply suggestive and novel account of logic which has yet to be explored or developed.

View the longer abstract here: Abstract